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REGULATING CRIME LABORATORIES:
THE IMPACT OF DNA EVIDENCE
Paul C. Giannelli, J.D., M.S.*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most trenchant criticisms of crime laboratories
was made in 1991 by Professor Randolph Jonakait in his multipronged attack on forensic science.1 He argued that the
“[c]urrent regulation of clinical labs indicates that a regulatory
system can improve crime laboratories.”2 This critique was
*

Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of
Law, Case Western Reserve University. University of Virginia, J.D. 1970,
LL.M. 1975; George Washington University, M.S. Forensic Science, 1973.
1
See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation,
4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 109 (1991). Before Jonakait wrote on the subject,
only a few articles appeared in the legal literature, and they were quite
favorable. See Irving C. Stone, Capabilities of Modern Forensic
Laboratories, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 674 (1984) (“This Article has
demonstrated the ability of forensic science laboratories to provide useful,
accurate information in a variety of areas.”); Marion E. Williams, The FBI
Laboratory—Its Availability and Use by Prosecutors from Investigation to
Trial, 28 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 95 (1960) (“These examinations are based
on sound scientific principles, far from the scene of the crime, by experts
dedicated to the principle of reporting fact regardless of whether they may
convict the guilty or acquit the innocent.”). See also Paul L. Kirk, The
Interrelationship of Law and Science, 13 BUFF. L. REV. 393 (1963)
(explaining the role of forensic science in the legal system). For a more
recent article by a criminalist, see Henry C. Lee, Forensic Science and the
Law, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1124 (1993) (“Perhaps the most important
issue in forensic science is the establishment of professional standards.”).
2
Jonakait, supra note 1, at 191. Clinical labs are regulated under the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
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largely ignored by the forensic science community, as was
another unfavorable legal commentary published about the same
time.3 Nevertheless, a far more powerful engine for reform was
on the horizon—DNA technology. In the same year that Jonakait
published his article, molecular biologist Eric Lander, who got
caught up in the DNA evidence debates, wrote: “At present,
forensic science is virtually unregulated—with the paradoxical
result that clinical laboratories must meet higher standards to be
allowed to diagnose strep throat than forensic labs must meet to
put a defendant on death row.”4
Part I of this article traces the history of crime laboratories
in this country, from their creation in California in the 1920s to
their nationwide expansion in the 1930s to their explosive
growth at the end of the century. Part II then discusses two
significant developments, the advent of proficiency testing and
the establishment of the first voluntary laboratory accreditation
program. The introduction of DNA evidence and its impact on
forensic science and crime laboratories in particular is examined
in Part III. Next, Part IV discusses the American Bar
Association (ABA) initiatives regarding the regulation of crime
laboratories — the adoption of recommendations emanating from
the ABA Committee on Innocence and the subsequent
promulgation of Criminal Justice Standards for DNA Evidence.

578 (1988), 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2004).
3
See D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy For
Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,”
137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 738 (1989) (“Our literature search for empirical
evaluation of handwriting identification turned up one primitive and flawed
validity study from nearly 50 years ago, one 1973 paper that raises the issue
of consistency among examiners but that presents only uncontrolled
impressionistic and anecdotal information not qualifying as data in any
rigorous sense, and a summary of one study in a 1978 government report.
Beyond this, nothing.”) (citations omitted).
4
Eric S. Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Trial, 339 NATURE 501, 505
(1989).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY
It should come as no surprise that a society as dependent
on science as ours would turn to that discipline to solve crimes.
Forensic laboratories were first introduced as reform efforts,
providing a reliable alternative to the vagaries of eyewitness
testimony and the “third degree” abuses used in eliciting
confessions. Nevertheless, their history is checkered, with
periods of rapid growth, followed by years of neglect.
Moreover, their place in the police organizational structure
remains ambivalent, and their function in the adversary system
is often problematic.
A. The Early Laboratories
In 1923, Los Angeles established the country’s first crime
laboratory.5 August Vollmer, sometimes known as the “father”
of modern policing in America,6 created the laboratory during
his brief tenure as Chief of Police in Los Angeles. As the first
police chief in Berkeley, Vollmer had used scientists on several

5

See RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
FORENSIC SCIENCE 6 (5th ed. 1995) (“The oldest forensic laboratory in the
United States is that of the Los Angeles Police Department, created in 1923
by August Vollmer, a police chief from Berkeley, California.”). There is
some dispute about which lab was established first. V.A. Leonard states that
Vollmer first created a lab at Berkeley. V.A. LEONARD, THE POLICE OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 141 (1964). Professor Thornton disagrees. See John I.
Thornton, Criminalistics: Past, Present and Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA 1,
23 (1975) (“In 1923, Vollmer served as Chief of Police of the City of Los
Angeles for a period of one year. During that time, a crime laboratory was
established at his direction.”). Some commentators cite Chicago as the initial
lab. E.g., Charles M. Wilson, Crime Detection Laboratories in the United
States, in LAW, MEDICINE, SCIENCE, AND JUSTICE 464 (Larry Baer ed.,
1964), reprinted in FORENSIC SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 96, 98 (Joseph L. Peterson ed., 1975). This is also
incorrect. See Thornton, supra, at 24.
6
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/August_Vollmer (last visited Sept. 21,
2006).
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occasions to investigate crimes,7 and in 1916, he helped found
the first School of Criminology at the University of California,
at Berkeley.8 By 1930, the L.A. Sheriff’s Department had set up
a lab to serve the unincorporated areas of Los Angeles County,
and in 1931, a statewide laboratory was opened in Sacramento
under the auspices of the Bureau of Criminal Identification and
Investigation. San Francisco followed suit later that year.9
Another early lab, operated by the Chicago police, traced its
roots to the infamous 1929 St. Valentine’s Day Massacre where
five gangsters and two acquaintances were gunned down.10 The
Massacre attracted national attention, in part, because some of
the perpetrators wore police uniforms and fled in a “squad” car.
Many suspected police involvement in the planning and
execution of the Massacre.11 A “blue ribbon” coroner’s jury,
empanelled to investigate the crime, contacted Colonel Calvin
Goddard, who maintained an independent firearms laboratory in
New York, to analyze the crime scene bullets and cartridge
cases.12 Goddard tested and excluded all police-issued Thompson

7

For example, Vollmer enlisted the services of a professor of chemistry
in a poisoning case in 1907 and later used a microscopist in a different case,
both from the University of California. Thornton, supra note 5, at 22.
8
See Berkeley Police Dep’t History, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/
police/history/history.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
9
Thornton, supra note 5, at 23-24. See also David Q. Burd, The
Laboratory Section of the California State Bureau Criminal Identification and
Investigation, 43 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 829, 829 (1953)
(“In [1931], one civil service position of Chemist and Ballistics Expert was
established, and some new equipment was obtained.”).
10
See Calvin Goddard, The Valentine Day Massacre: A Study in
Ammunition-Tracing, 1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 60, 60 (1930).
11
Id. at 76 (“Since two of the members of the execution squad had worn
police uniforms, and since it had been subsequently intimated by various
persons that the wearers of the uniforms might really have been policeman
rather than disguised gangsters, it became a matter of no little importance to
ascertain, if possible, whether these rumors had any foundation in fact.”).
12
Goddard, often credited as the “father” of firearms identification, was
responsible for much of the early work on the subject. See Calvin Goddard,
Scientific Identification of Firearms and Bullets, 17 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 254 (1926).
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submachine guns as the murder weapons and months later
matched the bullets to two machine guns seized from the home
of Fred Burke, a suspect in the killings.13 It was later learned
that a rival gang, headed by Al Capone, instigated the
murders.14 A member of the coroner’s jury was so impressed
with Goddard’s work that he offered to fund a crime lab—The
Scientific Crime Laboratory of Chicago.15 As part of this
endeavor, Goddard traveled to Europe to learn about the
continental forensic system.16
“The laboratory, with Col. Goddard as its first director, was
established at the Law School of Northwestern University, in
1929-30. John Henry Wigmore, Dean of the Law School, was
responsible for this site.”17 Given Goddard’s background, the
lab’s cases “were heavily biased toward firearms identification,
with considerably less emphasis placed on trace evidence, blood,
and other areas.”18 The city took over the laboratory in 1938.19
J. Edgar Hoover began the Federal Bureau of Investigation
13

See Goddard, supra note 10, at 76-77.
See Lee Bey, Crime Lab Heads Into History: For 56 Yrs., Venerable
Facility Has Helped Cops Solve Cases, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 10, 1994,
at 15 (“Chicago might not have been the first city with a crime lab if Al
Capone hadn’t ordered the St. Valentine’s Day Massacre in 1929.”); Jim
Ritter, St. Valentine’s Hit Spurred Creation of Nation’s First Lab, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 40 (“Sixty-eight years ago this Friday, Al
Capone’s hit men dressed as cops and gunned down seven men in the Clark
Street headquarters of rival mobster Bugs Moran.”).
15
See JOE NICKELL & JOHN F. FISCHER, CRIME SCIENCE: METHODS OF
FORENSIC DETECTION 13 (1999) (“Perhaps the first truly significant crime
laboratory that could be called a national lab was the Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory, which began at Chicago in 1929. . . .”).
16
See Calvin Goddard, Scientific Crime Detection Laboratories in
Europe, 1 AM. J. POLICE SCI. 13, 15 (1930) (“My provisional opinion that
the United States is, for the most part, immeasurably behind Europe in
scientific methods of crime detection was completely confirmed.”).
17
Wilson, supra note 5, at 467.
18
Thornton, supra note 5, at 25.
19
Id. at 26 (“In 1938 the laboratory was transferred to the Chicago
Police Department in return for a payment of $25,000 to Northwestern
University.”). The Chicago lab was taken over by the Illinois State Police in
1996. See Bey, supra note 14.
14
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(“FBI”) crime laboratory in 1932. Hoover, the FBI director,
was intrigued with the idea of creating a lab and so he sent an
agent, Charles Appel, in 1931 to attend a training course offered
at Goddard’s lab.20 At its inception, the FBI lab had firearms
identification (“ballistics”) and fingerprint examiners.21 “During
its first month of service, the FBI Laboratory examiners handled
20 cases. In its first full year of operation, the volume increased
to a total of 963 examinations. By the next year that figure more
than doubled.”22 Handwriting comparisons, the examination of
various types of trace evidence (e.g., hairs, fibers, soils), and
serological testing of blood and semen would be added later.23
During this time, several sensational cases highlighted the
value of forensic evidence. The Sacco and Vanzetti trial in 1921
was one of the first cases to use firearms identification
evidence,24 and the extensive use of handwriting comparison
20

Thornton, supra note 5, at 25.
At that time, it was called the Criminological Laboratory. By 1933, it
was known as the Technical Laboratory. Ten years later it was renamed the
FBI Laboratory. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FBI LABORATORY 3 (1981).
22
Anniversary Report, 40 Years of Distinguished Scientific Assistance to
Law Enforcement, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. 4 (Nov. 1972).
23
Id. at 6, 25.
24
Sacco and Vanzetti were charged with murder during a payroll
robbery in 1921. Many believe their executions resulted more from their
foreign status and “radical” beliefs as anarchists than from the cogency of the
evidence presented against them. The presentation of the firearms
identification evidence in that case remains problematic. Professors Joughin
and Morgan commented on this issue:
On October 23 Captain Proctor made an affidavit indicating that
he had repeatedly told [the prosecutor] that he would have to
answer in the negative if he were asked whether he had found
positive evidence that the fatal bullet had been fired from
Sacco’s pistol. The statement which Proctor made on the witness
stand was: “My opinion is that it is consistent with being fired
by that pistol.”
G. LOUIS JOUGHIN & EDMUND M. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO &
VANZETTI 15 (1948). See also James E. Starrs, Once More Unto the Breech:
The Firearms Evidence in the Sacco and Vanzetti Case Revisited, Parts I &
II, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 630, 1050 (1986). The case was also one of the first
21
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testimony at the Lindbergh kidnapping trial in 1935 solidified
the role of the crime lab in the criminal justice system.25 As one
commentator noted, Bruno Hauptmann’s conviction and
execution for the Lindbergh kidnapping and murder, “on the
basis of circumstantial scientific evidence, created landmarks in
scientific crime detection, in the utilization of forensic scientists,
and in the courtroom presentation of scientific and demonstrative
evidence.”26
Crime laboratories soon sprang up in other large cities27 but
not without some disquietude.28 As one scholar observed, “Most
to raise the issue of the eyewitness misidentification. See FELIX
FRAGNKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1927) (“What is
the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The
identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy.”).
25
State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (N.J. 1935).
26
Michael Baden, Plenary Session: The Lindbergh Kidnapping Revisited:
Forensic Sciences Then and Now, 28 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1035 (1983). See also
D. Michael Risinger et al., supra note 3, at 770-71 (Albert Osborn, one of
the seven handwriting experts who testified against Hauptmann, “became a
kind of public hero, and the validity of ‘scientific’ handwriting identification
when practiced by a ‘competent’ practitioner became public knowledge,
which like much public knowledge, turns out to be not so clearly right.”).
27
See Joseph L. Peterson, The Crime Lab, in THINKING ABOUT POLICE
184, 185 (Carl Klockars ed., 1983) (“[T]he Chicago Crime Laboratory has
the distinction of being one of the oldest in the country. Soon after, however,
many other jurisdictions also built police laboratories in an attempt to cope
with the crimes of violence associated with the 1930s gangster era.”).
28
Joseph Nicol wrote :
After the early 1930s, crime laboratories were established in
rapid fashion until nearly all states and the major cities had some
facility for examining evidence. Not all laboratories were
properly founded. No model existed and the development
depended upon local whim and resources. For reasons of local
pride, some departments created laboratories by the device of a
name on the door. In many places, what may be called a crime
laboratory is in fact a small step beyond a latent fingerprint and
photographic set-up, adequate for evidence collection but
unsuited by equipment and staff to engage in the analysis and
evaluation of evidence.
Joseph D. Nicol, Present Status of Criminalistics, in LAW ENFORCEMENT,
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 245 (S.A. Yefsky ed., 1967). See also Thornton,
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laboratories owe their existence, not to a progressive attitude on
the part of police administrators, but because the police agencies
inaugurating laboratory services were shamed into it by adverse
publicity or the threat of it.”29
B. Laboratory Expansion
From 1970 to 1980, the number of laboratories doubled,
from about 100 to more than 200, with statewide systems
becoming more common.30 “During this period, Supreme Court
decisions restricting police interrogation practices, the
President’s Crime Commission Report and advice to police to
place greater reliance on physical evidence, the creation of the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the
availability of federal monies, the drug abuse explosion, and the
upsurge in violent crime were all factors that stimulated the
growth of laboratories.”31 Expansion, however, brought its own
supra note 5, at 27 (noting that “all too often the laboratory was poorly
conceived, poorly equipped, and poorly staffed”); Wilson, supra note 5, at
464 (“The historical picture of crime detection laboratories in the United
States is rather discouraging when viewed factually.”).
29
Thornton, supra note 5, at 27.
30
See Jan S. Bashinski & Joseph L. Peterson, Forensic Sciences, in
LOCAL GOVERNMENT: POLICE MANAGEMENT 559, 561 (4th ed. William
Geller & Darrel Stephens eds., 2004) (“Until 1970, most crime laboratories
were located in cities and counties, but in the 1970s and 1980s, statewide
systems of crime laboratories became popular. More than a dozen states
(including California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
and Texas) adopted such configurations to deliver scientific services to
medium- and small-size communities not already served by local laboratories.
These statewide systems now act in tandem with municipal and county
facilities in many states and provide the great bulk of service to state and
local law enforcement agencies.”) Many states established their laboratories
statutorily. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 691.1 (West 1997); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-2502 (1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2261 (1997); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 44-3-301 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-01-10 (1997); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 307.75 (West 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-6-103
(1982); TEX. REV. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 4413(14) (1997); VA. CODE ANN. §
2.1-426 (1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.75 (West 1997).
31
Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the
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problems. It occurred “without the benefit of national planning
or direction. The newly formed laboratories and existing
laboratories continued to suffer from the same old problems:
lack of coordination, unqualified personnel, and the absence of
uniform standards and procedures to guide the analysis and
interpretation of evidence.”32
C. Crime Commissions
At the incipient stages of this expansion, two different
presidential crime commissions reviewed the status of forensic
laboratories, thus providing additional perspectives on their
development. In 1967, President Johnson’s Crime Commission
made the following observation:
The crime laboratory has been the oldest and
strongest link between science and technology and
criminal justice. Because of this tradition, and
because the best laboratories, such as the FBI’s, are
well advanced, the Science and Technology Task
Force did not devote major attention to
criminalistics.33
The Task Force’s “impression” that forensic science was not
in need of serious attention, according to one commentator,
“astounded most practicing criminalists,” and was due, in part,
Nation’s Criminal Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10, 11 (1985).
32
Peterson, supra note 27, at 185. See also Thornton, supra note 5, at
29-30 (“A few laboratories in the country are adequately supported, but most
have some deficiency in equipment, staff, physical plant, or position in an
agency structure.”).
33
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES, TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 17-18 (1967). See also
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967)
(repeating the Task Force’s conclusions). According to Professor Kirk,
“Criminalistics has been defined as that profession and scientific discipline
directed to the recognition, identification, individualization and interpretation
of physical evidence through the application of the natural sciences to law and
science matters.” Kirk, supra note 1, at 394.
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to “the treacle which emanated from the FBI laboratory for
several decades.”34 At about the same time, another practitioner
noted that “criminalistics is poorly equipped to deal with the
enlarged responsibilities which have been so quickly thrust upon
it.”35
Interestingly, a different Commission Task Force, one on the
police, painted a somewhat different picture: “Proximity,
timeliness, and quality are the most important measures of
laboratory service. Some local police forces fail on all three
counts because they do not perform scientific evaluations
requiring sophisticated analysis, or fail to provide for tests.”36
The Commission did acknowledge that “the great majority of
police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and
lack highly skilled personnel able to use the modern equipment
now being developed.”37 As a remedy, the Commission
recommended the establishment of regional laboratories and the
expansion of research activities.38
In 1974, President Nixon’s Crime Commission also
addressed the subject, observing that “[t]oo many police crime
laboratories have been set up on budgets that preclude the
recruitment of qualified professional personnel” and “[t]oo often
the laboratory is not considered a primary budget item and is
one of the first units to suffer when budgets are trimmed. Such
practices relegate the crime laboratory to an inferior position
among other support services.”39 This last point raised an
important issue—a lab’s placement in a police department’s
34

Thornton, supra note 5, at 30.
Wilkaan Fong, Criminalistics and the Prosecutor, in PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, THE PROSECUTOR’S SOURCEBOOK 323 (James George & Ira
Cohen eds., 1969).
36
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 91 (1967). The Report added: “The
cost of staffing a laboratory facility capable of handling all needs of a police
department is considerable, and a complete program is beyond the financial
ability of most departments.” Id. at 92.
37
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra note 33, at 255.
38
Id.
39
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 304-05 (1974).
35
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organizational structure.40 “Many laboratories are situated in a
position in an agency structure where the laboratory director
reports to a police officer who lacks understanding of the
criminalistics function.”41
The Commission noted, as did its predecessor, that the cost
of operating a crime lab was “perhaps beyond the financial
capabilities of most police agencies.”42 Nevertheless, it found
that “most police agencies were unwilling to give up their
laboratories, even when they were not used effectively.”43
D. 1983 Survey
A survey of crime labs in 1983 provides a snapshot of the
organization and practices of the more than 300 labs operating at
that time.44 Approximately 80 percent of the laboratories were
situated within law enforcement and public safety agencies, with
the remaining labs located in medical examiners’ offices,
prosecutors’ offices, scientific/public health agencies, and other
public or private institutions.45 “Fifty-seven percent of the
40

One commentator states that the top laboratories are characterized by
the following attributes:
they (1) report to someone close to chief executive level in the
host agency,” (2) are “accredited,” (3) “measure . . . and
respond . . . to customer needs while maintaining scientific
integrity,” and (4) have “a significant proportion (at least 25%)
of [their] operating budget devoted to quality assurance and
training.
W.J. Tilstone, Organization of Laboratories, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
FORENSIC SCIENCES 68, 73 (Jay A. Seigel et al. eds., 2000).
41
Thornton, supra note 5, at 36.
42
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 305.
43
Id. at 301.
44
Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the
Nations’s Criminal Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10 (1985). The survey
was based on a compilation of 319 federal, state, and local crime
laboratories. Each received a copy of an eight-page questionnaire. “The
response rate was 82% (260/319) with a total of 257 usable questionnaires.”
Id. at 11.
45
Id.
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responding laboratories would only examine evidence submitted
by law enforcement officials.”46 Of the laboratories surveyed,
over 90 percent examined drugs, while more than 75 percent
analyzed semen, bloodstains, fibers, hairs, accelerants, paint,
and toolmarks.47 Over half performed firearms, glass, alcohol,
explosives, and fingerprints examinations, while less than half
evaluated questioned documents, gunshot residues, voiceprints,
or toxicological samples.48 The survey also revealed that, on
average, laboratory examiners testified in eight percent of the
drug prosecutions (ranging from 0 to 86 percent) and in 10
percent of criminalistics cases (ranging from 0 to 87 percent). In
other words, government experts were rarely challenged.
Moreover, “[o]n the average, examiners conferred with
prosecutors in 57 percent of cases, but with defense attorneys
only 13 percent of the time.”49
E. 2002 Survey
Nearly two decades later a second survey of laboratories,
conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, revealed that there
were now 351 publicly funded forensic laboratories in the
United States50—more than three times the number that existed
in 1967. These included 203 state or regional, 65 county, 50
municipal, and 33 federal labs.51 The size of the laboratories

46

Id. at 13.
Id. at 14-15.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 15-16. A later investigation attempted to gauge the impact of
labs on the justice system, finding that approximately “one quarter of the
citizens who had served on juries which were presented with scientific
evidence believed that had such evidence been absent, they would have
changed their verdicts—from guilty to not guilty.” Joseph L. Peterson et al.,
The Use and Effects of Forensic Science in the Adjudication of Felony Cases,
32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1748 (1987).
50
Joseph L. Peterson & Matthew J. Hickman, Census of Publicly
Funded Forensic Crime Laboratories, 2002, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULL. (Feb. 2005).
51
Id. at 1.
47
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varied considerably. “A typical laboratory in 2002 had 2
managers, 2 secretaries or clerks, 12 analysts, and 2 technicians.
The median laboratory operating budget in 2002 was $1.3
million.”52 In contrast, the FBI Laboratory, the largest publicly
funded forensic laboratory in the country, had 585 full-time
employees as of January 2004, more than twice the size of the
next largest publicly funded crime lab.53 In addition to the FBI
facility,54 federal laboratories are operated by the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Internal Revenue Service, Postal
Inspection Service, Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, Customs Service, and the military.55 The federal
laboratories often provide their services to state law enforcement
agencies. The services of the FBI Laboratory, for instance, are
“available without charge to all duly constituted state, county,
and municipal law enforcement agencies of the United States and
its territorial possessions.”56 Approximately half of all the lab
requests in 2002 were for drug examinations.57 In contrast, only

52

Id.
Id. at 11.
54
The new FBI Lab at Quantico, Virginia, was dedicated in 2003. At a
cost of over $150 million, it took four years to build. See generally Modern
Marvels: FBI’s Crime Lab (The History Channel 2004) (discussing the
historical and recent advancements of the FBI crime lab); DAVID FISHER,
HARD EVIDENCE: HOW DETECTIVES INSIDE THE FBI’S SCI-CRIME LAB HAVE
HELPED SOLVE AMERICA’S TOUGHEST CASES (1995) (discussing the FBI
Lab’s successes).
55
Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance
in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305, 1328-29
(2004) (citing cases in which experts from these labs testified).
56
28 C.F.R. § 0.85(g) (2006) (authorizing the FBI lab “to provide,
without cost, technical and scientific assistance . . ., for all duly constituted
law enforcement agencies, . . . which may desire to avail themselves of the
service”). “It is quite common to find FBI or other federal experts testifying
in state criminal proceedings about a diverse array of forensic procedures,
including the analysis of drugs, blood, hair, fibers, firearms, fingerprints,
gunshot residues, shoeprints, voice comparisons, and the like.” Giannelli,
supra note 55, at 1329-30 (footnotes omitted).
57
Peterson & Hickman, supra note 50, at 1.
53
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2 percent involved DNA.58 Only 52 percent had resources
dedicated to training, and a mere 12 percent had resources for
research.59
Questions persisted, however. A 1997 needs assessment of
the California state-run system “found major problems in several
of the system’s laboratory facilities, including safety concerns,
overcrowding, and the potential for cross-contamination of
evidence,” and a 1998 state audit “found that the majority of
crime laboratories operated by local law enforcement agencies in
that state greatly needed new facilities and equipment and that
their quality assurance and training programs were hampered by
a lack of funding.”60
II. NOTABLE DEVELOPMENTS
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, there were two
developments that would have profound effects on crime labs—
the introduction of proficiency testing in forensic science and the
creation of a voluntary laboratory accreditation program. The
first highlighted serious shortcomings in the operation of some
laboratories and the performance of some examiners. The
second represented the first attempt at the self-regulation of
laboratories.
A. The Advent of Proficiency Testing
In 1978, the results of the first Laboratory Proficiency
Testing Program, sponsored by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA), were reported.61 Over 200 crime
laboratories participated in this program, which involved such
common forensic examinations as firearms, blood, drug, and

58

Id. at 6.
Id. at 1.
60
Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 30, at 563.
61
JOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY
TESTING RESEARCH PROGRAM (1978).
59
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trace evidence analyses.62 Seventy-one percent of the crime
laboratories tested provided unacceptable results in a blood test,
51.4 percent made errors in matching paint samples, 35.5
percent erred in a soil examination, and 28.2 percent made
mistakes in firearms identifications.63 The Report concluded: “A
wide range of proficiency levels among the nation’s laboratories
exists, with several evidence types posing serious difficulties for
the laboratories . . . .”64 Thus, although some laboratories
performed exceptionally well, the performance of others was
disturbing: “65 percent of the laboratories had 80 percent or
more of their results fall into the acceptable category. At the
other end of the spectrum, 3 percent of laboratories had less
than 50 percent of their responses considered acceptable.”65
Similarly, certain types of examinations caused few problems,
whereas others produced very high rates of “unacceptable
proficiency.”66 Unacceptable proficiency was most often
attributed to: (1) misinterpretation of test results due to
carelessness or inexperience; (2) failure to employ adequate or
appropriate methodology; (3) mislabeling or contamination of
primary standards; and (4) inadequate databases or standard
spectra.67
Given these results, one would have expected the
implementation of fairly extensive reforms. However, “[t]he
startling conclusions from that research led to some efforts to
62

Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 251.
64
Id. at 3.
65
Peterson, supra note 27, at 195.
66
The number of laboratories responding ranged from a low of 65 to a
high of 205. An unacceptable response did not necessarily mean an incorrect
one. Other reasons for an unacceptable designation included a correct
response for the wrong reason, an unsupported, inclusive response, multiple
responses, and incomplete responses. Id. at 188-91.
67
PETERSON ET AL., supra note 61, at 258. Professor Peterson, one of
the report’s authors, later commented: “In spite of being a firm advocate of
forensic science, I must acknowledge that a disturbingly high percentage of
laboratories are not performing routine tests competently, as shown by our
proficiency testing.” Symposium on Sci. and the Rules of Legal Procedure,
101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1983) (remarks of Professor Joseph L. Peterson).
63
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improve conditions in the laboratories, but these encounter[ed]
institutional inertia against reform.”68 In sum, widespread
reform (e.g., mandatory accreditation of laboratories and
certification of examiners) failed to materialize.69 Yet, from this
time forward proficiency testing would be part of the forensic
lexicon.70
B. The Creation of ASCLD/LAB
The proficiency testing results, however, did provide the
impetus for the formation of the American Society of Crime Lab
Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) in

68

Symposium, supra note 67, at 645 (remarks of Professor Joseph L.
Peterson). For a more detailed discussion of proficiency testing, see Michael
J. Saks, Prevalence and Impact of Ethical Problems in Forensic Science, 34
J. FORENSIC SCI. 772, 778 (1989) (reviewing proficiency testing results;
“Perhaps the major lessons to be drawn from this are that errors are indeed
made and that there is a wide range of interlaboratory variation.”).
69
Accreditation focuses on the laboratory, while certification focuses on
the individual examiner.
Unlike most other scientific professions, the criminalistics (crime
laboratory) field is without procedures to assess and recognize
members of the profession who have satisfied minimum criteria
for practicing in their forensic specialty. . . . [G]uidelines were
presented to the nation’s crime laboratory personnel for approval
in the form of a referendum in the fall of 1979. The subsequent
response, unfortunately, was distinctly negative; the certification
referendum was defeated by a two-to-one margin. Consequently,
at the present time, the criminalistics profession is without any
minimum standards regarding who is qualified to practice in the
field.
Peterson, The Crime Lab, supra note 27 at 197.
70
See Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Feasibility of External Blind DNA
Proficiency Testing. 1. Background and Findings, 48 J. FORENSIC SCI. 21
(2003); Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory
Proficiency Testing Results, 1978-1991, I: Identification and Classification of
Physical Evidence, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 994 (1995); Joseph L. Peterson &
Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 19781991, II: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009
(1995).
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1981, a second noteworthy development. Its purpose was to
establish an accreditation program for public and private crime
laboratories.71 Requirements include ensuring the integrity of
evidence, adhering to valid and generally accepted procedures,
employing qualified examiners, and operating quality assurance
programs—i.e., proficiency testing, technical reviews, audits,
and corrective action procedures.72
Although it has been criticized as being too closely tied to
the laboratories it accredits,73 this criticism is overblown and
ASCLD/LAB has been one of the most effective reform
mechanisms in forensic science over the last two decades.74
Only 10 percent of laboratories pass muster on the first
inspection. Moreover, in 1993, ASCLD/LAB provided the
review of the misconduct in the Fred Zain case,75 and in 2005,
it issued a critical report of the Virginia state lab in the Earl
Washington case.76 Regrettably, accreditation is voluntary, and
71

Bashinski & Peterson, supra note 30, at 578.
Id.
73
See Janine Arvizu, Shattering the Myth: Forensic Laboratories, 24
THE CHAMPION 18, 20 (May 2000) (“The ASCLD/LAB is essentially a trade
organization of crime laboratory directors. The membership of the
ASCLD/LAB delegate assembly consists solely of the laboratory directors of
ASCLD accredited laboratories.”); Maurice Possley et al., Scandal Touches
Even Elite Labs: Flawed Work, Resistance to Scrutiny Seen Across U.S., CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, at C1 (“I believe they are more of a fraternal
organization than an authoritative scientific body.”; quoting James Durkin, a
former Cook County prosecutor and former Republican state representative).
74
This is not to say the ASCLD/LAB program could not be improved.
For example, its governing board could be expanded to include outside
scientists from academia and representatives from the legal community,
including the defense bar, and it may be that some of its accreditation
requirements should be raised.
75
See infra text accompanying notes 117-19 (discussing Zain’s
misconduct).
76
See ASCLD/LAB LIMITED SCOPE INTERIM INSPECTION REPORT:
COMMONWEALTH OF VA. DIV. OF FORENSIC SCI. CENTRAL LABORATORY
(April 9, 2005). See generally MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN, THE
NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. (2003) (examining the
Washington case); Eric M. Freedman, Earl Washington’s Ordeal, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089 (2001).
72
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while numerous labs have been accredited, many have not.77
III. DNA PROFILING
The advent of DNA profiling in 1985 revolutionized forensic
science.78 One court called DNA evidence the “single greatest
advance in the search for truth . . . since the advent of
cross-examination.”79 Even its early critics acknowledged that
77

In 2002, the President of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences

wrote:
Unfortunately, while the ASCLD/LAB program has been
successful in accrediting over 200 Laboratories, a large number
of forensic laboratories in the U.S. remain unaccredited by any
agency. A similar situation exists with death investigation
agencies accredited by the National Association of Medical
Examiners (NAME); forty such medical systems have been
accredited, covering only 25% of the U.S. population. The same
dichotomy exists in certification programs for the practicing
forensic scientist, even though forensic certification boards for
all the major disciples have been in existence for over a
decade. . . . Why have forensic laboratories and individuals
been so reluctant to become accredited or certified?
Graham R. Jones, President’s Editorial—The Changing Practice of Forensic
Science, 47 J. FORENSIC SCI. 437, 438 (2002).
78
In 1985, Dr. Alec Jeffreys of the University of Leicester, England,
recognized the utility of DNA profiling in criminal cases. See OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC
USES OF DNA TESTS 8 (1990) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]. Its first use in
American courts occurred in 1986. Id. at 14. The first appellate case,
Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) review denied,
542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989) held that DNA evidence was admissible. By
January 1990, forensic DNA analysis had been admitted into evidence “in at
least 185 cases by 38 States and the U.S. military.” OTA REPORT, supra, at
14.
79
People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Co. Ct. 1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The popular press trumpeted DNA evidence as
“foolproof.” DNA Prints: A Foolproof Crime Test, TIME, Jan. 26, 1987, at
66. See also Arastasia Toufexis, Convicted by Their Genes: A New Forensic
Test is Revolutionizing Criminal Prosecutions, TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 74.
Moreover, the private DNA laboratories, Lifecodes and Cellmark, promoted
DNA’s use by claiming that it had “the power to identify one individual in
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“[a]ppropriately carried out and correctly interpreted, DNA
typing is possibly the most powerful innovation in forensics
since the development of fingerprinting in the last part of the
19th Century.”80 No other technique had been as complex or so
subject to rapid change. New DNA technologies were introduced
at the trial level as cases litigating the older procedures worked
their way through the appellate court system.81 As one
the world’s population” and “the chance that any two people will have the
same DNA print is one in 30 billion.” Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman,
When Science Takes the Witness Stand, SCI. AM., May 1990, at 46, 50.
“Cellmark entitled one of its informational brochures DNA FingerprintingSM,
The Ultimate Identification Test.” Dan Burk, DNA Identification: Possibilities
and Pitfalls Revisited, 31 JURIMETRICS J. 53, 85 n.119 (Fall 1990).
80
Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hartl, Population Genetics in
Forensic DNA Typing, 254 SCIENCE 1745, 1746 (1991). A National Academy
of Sciences report echoed this sentiment: “DNA analysis is one of the
greatest technical achievements for criminal investigation since the discovery
of fingerprints.” NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 73 (1996) [hereinafter NRC II].
81
The initial technique, Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism
(RFLP) analysis by gel electrophoresis, was soon supplanted by Polymerase
Chain Reaction (PCR)-based methods involving the DQ-alpha locus,
“polymarkers,” and the D1S80 locus. These, in turn, were replaced by Short
Tandem Repeats, the current procedure. See 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI &
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENCE EVIDENCE ch. 18 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing admissibility of DNA evidence). In addition to nuclear DNA
analysis, courts have admitted evidence based on mitochondrial DNA
(mtDNA) sequencing, as well as DNA analyses of animals, plants, and the
HIV virus. See United States v. Boswell, 270 F.3d 1200, 1205 (8th Cir.
2001) (comparing swine blood); State v. Bogan, 905 P.2d 515, 520 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995) (tree); State v. Schmidt, 699 So. 2d 448, 452-56 (La. Ct.
App. 1997) (admitting expert testimony that HIV viruses from two persons
were “closely related” using phylogenetic analysis and statistical testing in a
case regarding attempted murder by injection of HIV virus). Finally, the use
of DNA databases for “cold hits” presents additional evidentiary issues. See
People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he
fact that many profiles have been searched increases the probability of finding
a match, so that conceptually, the more populated the database, the less
impressive the match. Appellant contends that there is broad scientific
consensus concerning the need to determine differently the statistical
significance of profile matches in a cold hit case versus a confirmation case,
but says that the means of determining the statistical value of a cold hit ‘is a
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prosecutor observed, DNA evidence “raised issues at the cutting
edge of modern law and science.”82
The power of DNA analysis, however, could only be
harnessed by introducing scientific methodologies into the crime
lab, the lack of which became apparent in some of the early
evidentiary hearings.83 As a result of these challenges, New
York became the first state to regulate its crime labs.84 In
addition, the potential for DNA databases produced the first
federal legislation regulating forensic science—the DNA
Identification Act of 1994.85 Finally, as innocent convicts were
exonerated by DNA and released from prison, reformers began
to cast a critical eye on the forensic techniques that led to some
of these wrongful incarcerations, often finding traditional
forensic techniques deficient, especially when compared with
DNA profiling.86
A. Admissibility Wars
Early cases accepted DNA without question. There was no
defense expert in Andrews v. State,87 the first reported appellate
case considering the admissibility of DNA evidence. Nor was
there a defense expert in Spencer v. Commonwealth,88 the first
DNA execution case.89 At trial, the prosecution experts
“testified unequivocally that there was no disagreement in the
scientific community about the reliability of DNA print

matter of continuing and strident debate.’”).
82
HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLOOD CRIED OUT: A PROSECUTOR’S
SPELLBINDING ACCOUNT OF THE POWER OF DNA 21 (1996).
83
See infra text accompanying notes 92-102.
84
See infra text accompanying notes 113-16.
85
See infra text accompanying notes 109-12.
86
See infra text accompanying notes 117-27.
87
533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
88
384 S.E.2d 785, 792 (Va. 1989).
89
See Murderer Put to Death in Virginia: First U.S. Execution Based on
DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at A19 (reporting Spencer’s
execution).
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testing”90 and claimed that there was “no dissent whatsoever in
the scientific community.”91 This bit of self-deception was soon
shattered. In a landmark case, People v. Castro,92 the court
wrote: “In a piercing attack upon each molecule of evidence
presented, the defense was successful in demonstrating to this
court that the testing laboratory failed in its responsibility to
perform the accepted scientific techniques and experiments.”93
Castro involved a 14-week evidentiary hearing with a 5,000page transcript.94 In an unusual occurrence, the prosecution and
defense experts met without the attorneys and issued a joint
statement, including the following: “[T]he DNA data in this case
are not scientifically reliable enough to support the assertion that
the samples . . . do or do not match. If this data were submitted
to a peer reviewed journal in support of a conclusion, it would
not be accepted. Further experimentation would be required.”95
One scholar summed it up this way:
The substance of the preliminary hearing in Castro
stands for the idea that the standards of research
scientists ought to be the standards of forensic
science—an idea that, if taken to its logical extreme,
could make many kinds of commonly-used forensic
evidence, from fingerprint identifications to expert
document
examination
to
ballistics
analysis
inadmissible in court until additional research is done
to establish the validity of the claims to which
forensic experts routinely testify.96
Castro was not alone.97 In United States v. Yee,98 the first
90

Spencer, 384 S.E.2d at 792.
Id. at 797.
92
545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
93
Id. at 996.
94
Id. at 986.
95
Lander, supra note 4, at 504.
96
Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro: Challenging the Forensic Use
of DNA Evidence, in EVIDENCE STORIES 207, 209 (Richard Lempert ed.,
2006).
97
The Office of Technology Assessment report also recognized that
[s]erious questions are raised . . . about how best to ensure that
91
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DNA case involving the FBI’s profiling system, an extensive
six-week admissibility hearing was held. Each side had retained
exceptional attorneys who had access to impressive expert
witnesses.99 Yee was a major test for DNA evidence, and it
passed. Nevertheless, parts of the magistrate’s report were
troublesome. The magistrate wrote that “the FBI program of
proficiency testing has serious deficiencies, even without
consideration of the troubling hint in the record of an impulse at
one point to destroy some of the small amount of test data that
had been accumulated earlier.”100 In another passage, he wrote:
“I do not either disregard or discount the accuracy of many of
the criticisms about the remarkably poor quality of the FBI’s
work and infidelity to important scientific principles.”101 The
FBI’s top DNA scientist, Dr. Bruce Budowle, would later
acknowledge the shortfalls of DNA evidence when first
introduced:
The initial outcry over DNA typing standards
concerned laboratory problems: poorly defined rules
for declaring a match; experiments without controls;
contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy
interpretation of autoradiograms. Although there is no
evidence that these technical failings resulted in any
wrongful convictions, the lack of standards seemed to

any particular test result is reliable. These questions focus on
data interpretation, how to minimize realistic human error, and
the appropriate level of monitoring to ensure quality. Such
questions, which stem from actual court cases, underscore the
need to develop both technical and operational standards now.
OTA REPORT, supra note 78, at 83 (emphasis in original).
98
134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff’d sub nom., United States v.
Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
99
The prominent experts for the prosecution included Dr. Thomas
Caskey of Baylor University and Dr. Kenneth K. Kidd of Yale University.
Dr. Richard C. Lewontin of Harvard University and Dr. Daniel Hartl, then
of Washington University, were defense experts. Dr. Eric Lander served as a
court appointed expert. See id.
100
Id. at 208.
101
Id. at 210.
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be a recipe for trouble.102
The DNA admissibility wars highlighted the need for a more
scientific approach to forensic evidence.103 The National
Academy of Sciences issued two reports on the subject, noting
the importance of certain practices: “No laboratory should let its
results with a new DNA typing method be used in court, unless
it has undergone . . . proficiency testing via blind trials.”104 The
initial skirmishes over laboratory protocols regarding DNA
quickly gave way to fights over statistical interpretation and
population genetics.105 These challenges had a salutary effect.106
102

Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid
to Rest, 371 NATURE 735, 735 (Oct. 27, 1994). See also JAMES D. WATSON
& ANDREW BERRY, DNA: THE SECRET OF LIFE 273 (2004) (“Initially, when
DNA fingerprinting was done in forensic laboratories without special
expertise in handling and analyzing DNA, critical mistakes were not
uncommon.”). Watson, along with Francis Crick, discovered the double helix
structure of DNA. Id. at 11-12.
103
See William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New
Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons From the DNA ‘War,’ 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993).
104
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE 55 (1992) [hereinafter NRC I REPORT]. As requested by the FBI, a
second report followed. See NRC II, supra note 80, at v-vii. The second
report also recommended proficiency testing. See id. at 88 (Recommendation
3.2: “Laboratories should participate regularly in proficiency tests, and the
results should be available for court proceedings.”).
105
See Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting, 254
SCIENCE 1721, 1721 (Dec. 20, 1991) (noting that “a half-dozen courts
recently refused to admit DNA evidence on the grounds that the probability
calculations are not generally accepted”); see also Ranajit Chakraborty &
Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 SCIENCE
1735, 1735 (Dec. 20, 1991) (acknowledging inconsistencies in DNA data,
while expressing the opinion that DNA fingerprinting still yields “a
meaningful estimate” that a jury can rely on).
106
See MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 204
(2001) (The British “Forensic Science Service adopted a method of
calculating DNA match probabilities that had been proposed by statisticians
associated with the defence side of the DNA dispute.”). See also Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L.
REV. 13, 70 (2001) (“[W]hile it is easy to disparage ‘battles of the experts’
as expensive, misleading, and confusing to the factfinder, these battles may
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Even the DNA proponents subsequently conceded that “most
would now agree that this extended debate has been good for the
science.”107
It was not long before commentators were asking why such
procedures were not applied in other forensic fields.108 In short,
DNA analysis became the gold standard against which other
forensic sciences would be measured.
B. 1994 Federal Legislation
The passage of the landmark DNA Identification Act of
1994109 represented the first federal attempt to regulate a crime
lab procedure. It authorized the creation of a national database
for the DNA profiles of convicted offenders as well as a
database for crime scene profiles: the Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS). Bringing CODIS online was a monumental
endeavor, and its successful operation required an effective
quality assurance program. As one government report noted,
“the integrity of the data contained in CODIS is extremely
also reveal genuine weaknesses in proffered expert knowledge.”).
107
IAN W. EVETT & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE:
STATISTICAL GENETICS FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS xiv (1998). See also
Richard Lempert, Comment: Theory and Practice in DNA Fingerprinting, 9
STATISTICAL SCI. 255, 258 (1994) (“[I]n this instance the importation of legal
adversariness into the scientific world has spurred both valuable research and
practical improvements in the way DNA is analyzed and presented.”).
108
See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA
“Fingerprinting” Can Teach the Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 372 (1991) (“[F]orensic scientists, like scientists in
all other fields, should subject their claims to methodologically rigorous
empirical tests. The results of these tests should be published and debated.
Until such steps are taken, the strong claims of forensic scientists must be
regarded with far more caution than they traditionally have been.”). See also
Mnookin, supra note 96, at 43 (“One consequence of DNA profiling and its
admissibility into court is that it has opened the door to challenging
fingerprinting.”); Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y
143, 143 (2005) (“DNA identification has not only transformed and
revolutionized forensic science, it has also created a new set of standards that
have raised expectations for forensic science in general.”).
109
42 U.S.C. § 14131(a) & (c) (2000).
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important since the DNA matches provided by CODIS are
frequently a key piece of evidence linking a suspect to a
crime.”110 The statute created a DNA Advisory Board (DAB) to
assist in promulgating quality assurance standards.111 The Act
also required proficiency testing for analysts in the FBI as well
as those in labs participating in the national database or
receiving federal funding.112
C. New York Statute
In the same year that Congress enacted DNA legislation,
New York became the first state to regulate its forensic
laboratories.113 The New York statute established a Commission
on Forensic Science,114 which is authorized (1) to develop
minimum standards and a program of accreditation for all state
laboratories, (2) to establish minimum qualifications for
laboratory directors and other personnel, and (3) to approve
110

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT,
THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM ii (2001).
111
42 U.S.C. § 14131(a) (2000). The legislation contained a sunset
provision; DAB would expire after five years unless extended by the Director
of the FBI. 42 U.S.C. § 14131(b) (2000). The FBI had established the
Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (TWGDAM) in 1988
to develop standards. TWGDAM functioned under DAB. It was renamed
Scientific Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods (SWGDAM) in 1999
and replaced the DAB when the latter expired. See NORAH RUDIN & KEITH
INMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC DNA ANALYSIS 180 (2d ed. 2002).
112
42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2) (2006) (external proficiency testing for
CODIS participation); id. at §14133(a)(1)(A) (2006) (FBI examiners). DAB
Standard 13 implements this requirement. DNA ADVISORY BOARD STANDARD
13 (1998). The Justice for All Act, enacted in 2004, amended the statute,
requiring all DNA labs to be accredited within two years “by a nonprofit
professional association of persons actively involved in forensic science that
is nationally recognized within the forensic science community” and to
“undergo external audits, not less than once every 2 years, that demonstrate
compliance with standards established by the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(2) (2006).
113
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995b (McKinney 2006) (requiring accreditation
by the state Forensic Science Commission).
114
N.Y. EXEC. § 995-a (McKinney 1996).
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forensic laboratories for the performance of specific forensic
methodologies.115 Significantly, research scientists and the
defense bar were represented on the Commission.116
D. DNA Exonerations
DNA technology had an additional effect on the regulation of
forensic science, one emanating from its power to exonerate the
innocent. One of the first defendants to be freed was Glen
Woodall,117 whose exoneration triggered an investigation of the
West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory,118 a process that
115

See Michael Saks et al., Model Prevention and Remedy of Erroneous
Convictions Act, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 669, 698-703 (2001) (discussing
Commission on Forensic Science Services).
116
N.Y. EXEC. § 995-a (McKinney 1996). The commission has fourteen
members. The commissioner of the division of criminal justice services is the
chair. The commissioner of the department of health or a designee is an exofficio member. Twelve members are appointed by the governor: (1) one is a
chair of the N.Y. state crime laboratory advisory committee; (2) one is a
director of a N.Y. forensic laboratory; (3) one is the director of the office of
forensic services; (4) two are scientists with experience in laboratory
standards or quality assurance regulation and monitoring, appointed upon
recommendation of the commissioner of health; (5) one is a representative of
a law enforcement agency, appointed upon the recommendation of the
commissioner of criminal justice services; (6) one is a representative of
prosecution services, appointed upon the recommendation of the
commissioner of criminal justice services; (7) one is a representative of the
public criminal defense bar, appointed upon the recommendation of an
organization representing public defense services; (8) one is a representative
of the private criminal defense bar, appointed upon the recommendation of an
organization of such bar; (9) two are members-at-large, one of whom is
appointed upon the recommendation of the temporary president of the senate
and the other upon the recommendation of the speaker of the assembly; and
(10) one is an attorney or judge with a background in privacy issues and
biomedical ethics, appointed upon the recommendation of the chief judge of
the court of appeals. Id.
117
See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY
JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 74-76 (1996) (National
Institute of Justice report documenting twenty-eight exoneration cases).
118
See George Castelle, Lab Fraud: Lessons Learned from the Fred Zain
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revealed the laboratory malfeasance of Fred Zain. Zain’s acts of
misconduct included:
(1) overstating the strength of results; (2) overstating
the frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces
of evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic
matches on multiple pieces of evidence; (4) reporting
that multiple items had been tested, when only a
single item had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive
results as conclusive; (6) repeatedly altering
laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create the
erroneous impression that genetic markers had been
obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing to report
conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report
conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting
results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when
testing supported only a match with the victim; and
(11) reporting scientifically impossible or improbable
results.119
The Zain affair illustrated the importance of written
protocols, accurate lab notes, and technical reviews.
Unfortunately, Zain was not alone. In Actual Innocence,
Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld, and Jim Dwyer examined 62 of
the first DNA exonerations secured through Cardozo Law
School’s Innocence Project to ascertain which factors contributed
to these miscarriages of justice. One of the more astounding
conclusions was that one-third of these cases involved “tainted
or fraudulent science.”120 By September of 2006, DNA evidence
Affair, THE CHAMPION 12 (May 1999); Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of
Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime
Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439 (1997). A number of TV shows
documented his abuses. See Right on, Fred Zain, CBS 60 MINUTES, April
24, 1994; Body of Evidence, NBC DATELINE, April 21, 1999.
119
In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology
Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting ASCLD report).
120
BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 248
(2000). The other causes include: Mistaken eyewitnesses (84%); Police
misconduct (50%); Prosecutorial misconduct (42%); Ineffective defense
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had exonerated at least 184 convicts.121 Another report, which
identified an additional 196 non-DNA exonerations,122 noted that
twenty-four cases involved “perjury by forensic scientists
testifying for the government.”123 Subsequent scandals in
Oklahoma and Texas led those states to legislate lab
accreditation.124 Similarly, problems in the Virginia DNA lab125
caused that state to make the Division of Forensic Science a
separate agency under the Secretary of Public Safety126 and to
create a Forensic Science Board and a Scientific Advisory
Committee.127
IV. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION INITIATIVES
As the number of DNA exonerations grew, the legal
profession could no longer dismiss these miscarriages of justice
counsel (27%); False confessions (24%); Jailhouse snitches (21%) Id.
121
See http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
122
See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005). “Overall, we
found 340 exonerations . . . . ; 144 of them were cleared by DNA evidence,
196 by other means.” Id. at 524 (internal citations omitted).
123
Id. at 543.
124
Forensic Laboratory Accreditation Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §
150.37 (2004) (requiring accreditation by (ASCLD/LAB or the American
Board of Forensic Toxicology); Forensic Analysis of Evidence, TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (2005) (requiring accreditation by the
Department of Public Safety). See also DNA and Forensic Identification Data
Base and Data Bank Act of 1998, CAL. PENAL CODE § 297 (2004) (requiring
accreditation by ASCLD/LAB or any certifying body approved by
ASCLD/LAB). Indiana does not require accreditation but does require a
laboratory conducting forensic DNA analysis to implement and follow
nationally recognized standards for DNA quality assurance and proficiency
testing, such as those approved by ASCLD/LAB. Laboratory Standards, IND.
CODE ANN. § 10-13-6-14 (2004).
125
The problems stemmed from the Earl Washington case. See note 76
supra.
126
VA. CODE § 9.1-1100 (2005) (changing Division of Forensic Science
into the Department of Forensic Science). Previously, it was under the
Department of Criminal Justice Services.
127
VA. CODE § 9.1-1111 & 1112 (2005).
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as aberrational. The numbers were too large, and the nature of
the causes too repetitive. Systemic problems were uncovered,
and comprehensive reforms were called for.
A. Innocence Policies
As a result, in 2002 the ABA Criminal Justice Section
established the Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the
Integrity of the Criminal Process.128 Forensic science was one
concern, and the ABA eventually recommended that “[c]rime
laboratories and medical examiner offices should be accredited,
examiners should be certified, and procedures should be
standardized and published to ensure the validity, reliability, and
timely analysis of forensic evidence.”129
Another ABA recommendation focused on funding.130 The
underfunding of crime labs in this country is chronic.131 As
noted earlier, both President Johnson’s and President Nixon’s
128

See REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC
INNOCENCE COMMITTEE TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE
GUILTY (Paul C. Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 2006) [hereinafter
INNOCENCE REPORT]. The Committee was charged with undertaking a review
of the causes for wrongful convictions and recommending policies to better
ensure that individuals will not be convicted of crimes they did not commit.
Over a three-year period, the Committee drafted resolutions and
accompanying reports that have now been adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates. They include resolutions on: false confessions, eyewitness
identification procedures, forensic evidence, jailhouse informants, defense
counsel practices, investigative policies and personnel, prosecution practices,
systemic remedies, and compensation for the wrongfully convicted. The
resolutions include recommendations for videotaping all interrogations,
accrediting crime laboratories, conducting double blind lineups, and requiring
corroboration in all cases involving jailhouse snitches. Id.
129
Id. at 47.
130
Id.
131
OTA REPORT, supra note 78, at 29 (“Most agree that crime
laboratories and forensic sciences research that supports technology transfer
to crime laboratories are underfunded. Increasingly, indications are that crime
laboratories are experiencing difficulties managing the steadily rising influx of
casework.”).
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Crime Commissions acknowledged the problem.132 Twenty years
later, a report on Washington State crime labs revealed that a
“staggering backlog of cases hinders investigations of murder,
rape, arson, and other major crimes.”133 At any time,
“thousands of pieces of evidence collected from crime scenes sit
unanalyzed and ignored on shelves in laboratories and police
stations across the state.”134 A USA Today survey reached the
same conclusion: “Evidence that could imprison the guilty or
free the innocent is languishing on shelves and piling up in
refrigerators of the nation’s overwhelmed and underfunded
crime labs.”135 In one case, the delay on processing evidence of
a rape was eighteen months, forcing the police to release the
suspect, and giving him time to rape a fourth victim.136
The ABA also recommended the appointment of defense
experts for indigent defendants “whenever reasonably necessary
to the defense.”137 While the Supreme Court recognized a due
process right to a defense expert in Ake v. Oklahoma,138 a
132

See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY
255 (1967) (“[T]he great majority of police department laboratories have only
minimal equipment and lack highly skilled personnel able to use the modern
equipment now being developed.”); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM’N ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 304 (1974)
(“Too many police crime laboratories have been set up on budgets that
preclude the recruitment of qualified, professional personnel.”).
133
Tomas Guillen & Eric Nalder, Overwhelming Evidence—Crime Labs
in Crisis—Staggering Backlog of Cases Hinders Investigations of Murder,
Rape, Arson and Other Major Crimes, SEATTLE TIMES, Jun. 19, 1994, at
A14.
134
Id.
135
Becky Beaupre & Peter Eisler, Crime Lab Crisis, USA TODAY, Aug.
20, 1996, at 1.
136
Id.
137
INNOCENCE REPORT, supra note 128, at 47. See also ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5-1.4,
cmt. at 22 (3d ed. 1992) (“The quality of representation at trial . . . may be
excellent and yet unhelpful to the defendant if the defense requires the
assistance of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no such services are
available.”).
138
470 U.S. 68 (1985).

GINAELLI OUT

3/3/2007 1:08 AM

REGULATING CRIME LABORATORIES

89

number of sources indicate that the lack of defense experts
continues to be a significant problem.139 Finally, the ABA
highlighted the importance of lawyer training in forensic
science, as well as attorney competence.140
B. ABA Standards on DNA Evidence
A second ABA project will also undoubtedly impact the
regulation of forensic science. The ABA Standards on DNA
Evidence cover a wide range of topics.141 Part III of the
139

See Giannelli, supra note 55, at 1311-13 (discussing the various
reports).
140
See, e.g., Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1209-11 (6th Cir. 1995)
(finding ineffective assistance in penalty phase of capital murder case for
failing to present evidence of defendant’s mental retardation/neurological
impairment, and by acquiescing to prosecutor’s suggestion that experts
requested by defense be treated as court-appointed rather than defense
experts, and by failing to challenge expert reports); Driscoll v. Delo, 71 F.3d
701, 709 (8th Cir. 1995) (In a capital murder case, whether alleged murder
weapon had blood matching the victim’s constituted an issue of the utmost
importance. Under these circumstances, a reasonable defense lawyer would
take some measures to understand the laboratory tests performed and the
inferences that one could logically draw from the results. At the very least,
any reasonable attorney under the circumstances would study the state’s
laboratory report with sufficient care so that if the prosecution advanced a
theory at trial that was at odds with the serology evidence, the defense would
be in a position to expose it on cross-examination.”); Foster v. Lockhart, 9
F.3d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure to pursue an impotency
defense in a rape case violated the right to effective assistance of counsel);
United States v. Tarricone, 996 F.2d 1414, 1418 (2d Cir. 1993) (concluding
that failure to consult handwriting expert made out a viable claim of
ineffectiveness); Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575, 1580 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding that failure to have quilt examined for gunshot residue rendered
representation ineffective).
141
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON DNA EVIDENCE (adopted
August 2006). The Standards include provisions on:
(1) the collection, preservation, and retention of biological evidence,
(2) pretrial disclosure,
(3) defense testing and retesting,
(4) the admissibility of DNA evidence,
(5) post-conviction testing,
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Standards governs the testing of DNA Evidence and includes
provisions on laboratories and the testing and interpretation of
DNA evidence. The Standards mandate (1) accreditation, for
crime laboratories every two years, (2) written policies,
including protocols for testing and interpreting test results, (3)
quality assurance procedures, including audits, proficiency
testing, and corrective action protocols, (4) procedures designed
to minimize cognitive bias when interpreting test results, and (5)
timely reports of credible evidence of lab misconduct or serious
negligence.142
The Standards stress two other points. The first is
transparency; most laboratory protocols and procedures should
be publicly available.143 The second is documentation. Each step
in the testing of DNA evidence and in the interpretation of the
test results should be recorded contemporaneously in case
notes.144 All case notes made and raw electronic data produced
during testing should be preserved and are discoverable.145
CONCLUSION
DNA evidence has revolutionized forensic science. The
DNA admissibility wars forced laboratories to develop protocols
for declaring a match, to use controls in testing, and to
promulgate procedures for interpreting autoradiograms. These
challenges also produced the first state statute on lab
accreditation—in New York, and the first federal legislation
regulating a forensic science. DNA profiling not only set the
“gold standard” for forensic evidence but also highlighted the
shortcomings of other forensic techniques through the
exonerations it produced.

(6) charging persons by DNA profile, and
(7) DNA databases.
Id.
142
143
144
145

ABA Standard 3.1(a).
Id. at 1.2(c) & 3.1(a)(vii).
Id. at 3.2.
Id. at 4.1(a).
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The impact of DNA analysis on forensic science in general
and crime labs in particular should be understood in a larger
context. In 1993, the year before the federal and New York
statutes were passed, the Supreme Court handed down its
landmark decision on the admissibility of expert testimony—
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.146 If DNA
evidence revolutionized forensic science, Daubert and its
progeny147 revolutionized the admissibility standard for evidence
based on forensic science. Daubert has been transformed from a
case that most courts and commentators believed lowered the
barriers to the admissibility of scientific evidence to one that the
Court now describes as imposing an “exacting” standard.148
Indeed, some federal courts have read the Daubert trilogy as
inviting a “reexamination even of ‘generally accepted’
venerable, technical fields.”149 As a result, attacks have been
launched against handwriting evidence,150 hair comparisons,151
146

509 U.S. 579 (1993).
The Court followed with General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), to
make up what is now known as the Daubert trilogy.
148
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000). See generally
Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Revisited, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 302 (2005)
(describing the transformation of Daubert).
149
United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D. Mass. 1999)
(handwriting comparison). See also United States v. Hidalgo, 229 F. Supp.
2d 961, 966 (D. Ariz. 2002) (“Courts are now confronting challenges to
testimony, as here, whose admissibility had long been settled.”; handwriting
comparison).
150
See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert Challenges to Fingerprints, 43 CRIM.
L. BULL. 624 (2006) (examining the controversy surrounding the
admissibility of fingerprint evidence).
151
See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla.
1995) (“This court has been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any
indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the
requirements of Daubert.”), rev’d on this issue, Williamson v. Ward, 110
F.3d 1508, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that due process, not Daubert,
standard applies in habeas proceedings). See generally Paul C. Giannelli &
Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 514 (2001)
(discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was used to
convict the innocent).
147
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fingerprint examinations,152 firearms identification,153 bitemark
analysis,154 gunshot residue testing,155 bullet composition
evidence,156 and intoxication testing.157 While many of these
challenges have failed, the landscape has irreversibly shifted.
Lawyers are now accustomed to challenging forensic evidence.
The combined effect of the introduction of DNA evidence
and the Daubert decision has altered the forensic paradigm and
has perhaps rendered the regulation of crime labs inevitable.

152

See Paul C. Giannelli & Carrin Cozza, Daubert Challenges to
Handwriting Comparisons, 42 CRIM. L. BULL. 347 (2006) (analyzing the case
law and research in the field of questioned document analysis).
153
See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005)
(limiting testimony); Adina Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability
and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark Identification, 6 COLUM.
SCIENCE & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2005).
154
See I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark
Analyses–A Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85, 86 (2001) (“Despite the
continued acceptance of bitemark evidence in European, Oceanic and North
American Courts, the fundamental scientific basis for bitemark analysis has
never been established.”).
155
See Michelle Nethercott & William C. Thompson, Lessons from
Baltimore’s GSR Debacle, THE CHAMPION 36 (June 2005).
156
See Ragland v. Commonwealth,191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006)
(excluding evidence); Clemons v. State, 896 A.2d 1059 (Md. 2006) (same);
State v. Behn, 868 A.2d 329 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (same). See
also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING
BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 6 (2004).
157
See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 549 (D. Md. 2002)
(“Where, as here, that reliability has been challenged, the court cannot
disregard the challenge, simply because a legion of earlier court decisions
reached conclusions based on reference to the same then-unchallenged
authority. . . . I cannot agree that [various intoxication] tests, singly or in
combination, have been shown to be as reliable as asserted by Dr. Burns, the
NHTSA publications, and the publications of the communities of law
enforcement officers and state prosecutors.”) (footnote omitted).

